Aggressive Mimicry
Secular neutrality is aggressive mimicry.
Let me explain. There is a species of viper that lives in the Zagros Mountains of Western Iran whose tail has a curious collection of scales protruding from it. This gives the tail the appearance of a spider, and that is precisely what the serpent uses it for. By concealing itself except for its tail, it lures in prey with the appearance of a quick and easy meal, then strikes and devours them. This is the method of liberalism, both classical and progressive.
What is secular neutrality? It is a doctrine originating in liberalism, dictating that the government specifically and public society generally may not protect, aid, promote, or even prefer any one religion over any other. Religion, it is said, is intolerant of opposing views, and by this intolerance and interference in government, makes itself and government less than they might otherwise be. Far better that society be run without reference to religion, and focus only on rational, practical decisions that benefit all of us regardless of individual faith.
It’s worth noticing at this point that secular neutrality has already violated its own principle. No one criticizes anything without having some end in mind that they want it to look like. By criticizing religion at all, secularism demonstrates that it isn’t truly neutral right off the bat. It has a vision of what religion “ought” to look like, coincidentally something much more in line with what secularism itself does. It is a rival religion seeking to enshrine itself in the hearts and halls of its predecessor. Genuine neutrality is as impossible for secularism as it is for anything else.
“Hold on a moment,” you might say, “I do genuinely want to leave people alone. How is refusing judgement itself a judgement?” Humans are barely able to understand the function of material reality, why would we think we can understand the whys and hows of morality? Seems a safer bet to avoid inevitably biasing ourselves and sticking with just enforcing those things we can all agree on, right?
It’s clear liberalism has failed at creating a cohesive multicultural and multireligious society. The question is “Can it?” Could liberalism have succeeded, if only we had done some things differently? Has “real liberalism” never been tried?
To return to the original question, then: what is secular neutrality? It originates within liberalism. What is liberalism, and where does it get this doctrine from? Liberalism is an ideology originating in natural law theory. Natural law theory argues that the rational and empirical examination of man and nature demonstrate certain principles intrinsic to man and his nature. These principles ought to be followed, and give us a general morality that allows for us to flourish. Locke, the father of liberalism, originated the concept of the separation of church and state. In other words, secular neutrality.
The reason for this is because liberalism is an egalitarian ideology. All men are naturally equal, with certain rights that stem from this universal equality. One of the most important rights within liberalism is the right of conscience. In Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration, he gives three arguments for it. First, the state in particular, and humans in general, cannot adequately judge between competing truth claims. Second, belief cannot be compelled by violence, thus any attempt to enforce the “true” religion would fail. Third, coercing uniformity creates more disorder than allowing diversity.1
At first glance, this government may sound rather nice. The current atmosphere of leftist lawfare and surveillance looks more like a radical divergence from liberalism’s foundation than any careful formation of it. We might think we would all be more content with a government that simply stays out of it’s citizens lives, rather than seeking to micromanage all aspects of it. We can all agree murder and theft are wrong, so why not avoid legislating in favor of a religion and simply focus on universal moral principles?
What is Nature?
Liberalism makes many claims of simply following the dictates of reason, gleaned from a rational examination of nature. This is, as mentioned, the “natural” part of natural law theory. The problem for liberalism generally, and secular neutrality specifically, is that any discussion of nature must include a definition of nature. What is nature? What is natural? Even more important, why is nature the way that it is?
The 16th-17th century French philosopher René Descartes offers the most foundational empirical axiom possible. “I think, therefore I am.” If I know nothing else, I know that I am a thinking, individual mind, because any attempt to question this axiom only demonstrates that there is an I that is recognizably separate from other things, and which thinks. This is where any empirical examination of nature must begin.
We can also (and have to, ultimately) assume that our reason is trustworthy, the world is rationally comprehensible, and that our physical senses correspond at some level with genuine reality. If we don’t assume these, then there is no way to rationally make sense of the world at all, and any attempt is worthless and nonsensical. The starting ground for natural law morality, then, must begin with the assumptions that we exist, reason exists, and that both our reason and our physical senses correspond to reality in a way that allows us to understand reality.
However, if this is all we can assume, then we run into serious problems, particularly for liberalism. The natural world is violent, shockingly so to many. Nature is a constant, bloody struggle for survival, where countless outrages are enacted daily between rival creatures from bacteria to blue whales. Even members of the same species compete for resources, territory, mating rights, etc. and will happily murder, steal, rape, or whatever else might secure their survival. When a wolf pack drags down a wounded moose, we don’t call that murder. We don’t even call it murder when a wolf kills another wolf, or even a human. Even where humans kill predators for harm done to themselves or their livestock, it is done more from revenge than as legal punishment for a crime. Man is clearly not naturally moral, and even a cursory glance at his history will show that violence and cruelty are near constants in it.
The liberal will often respond with the claim that man is different from the rest of the animals, he has different rules that apply to him. But what sets him apart? His intelligence? Dolphins and chimpanzees are supposed to be some of the smartest creatures on earth, yet they engage in some of the most shocking examples of murder, cannibalism, and rape. Even worse, their intelligence lends their actions an appearance of deliberate maliciousness. Is this what intelligence leads creatures (and thus man) to? If greater levels of intelligence lead to greater evil, why should man, the most intelligent, not become the most evil?
Before some get worried (or excited), I’m not arguing that man should be as evil as he can possibly be. No one actually wants to live in an amoral society, much less an explicitly evil one, not even those who claim to be anarchists or nihilists. At best, they want to be able to break the rules while requiring everyone else to abide by them. Many never even try to break the rules despite their claims.
What I am arguing is that if you want any sort of real morality, you have to add something else to your basic assumptions about reality. Empiricism alone doesn’t cut it. You have to add a teleology. There must be some end or purpose to man that sets him apart from the animals, something that accounts for his apparent viciousness, but directs him to something higher. There must be an intent to man beyond mere animal survival in order to give any sort of natural law, and laws do not just appear. They must be created.
Part 2 here.
Lest you think I’m agreeing with him, it’s worth noting that liberalism has obviously failed to avoid social unrest by increasing diversity (religious or otherwise), and Locke commits the same mistake mentioned at the beginning of assuming he can criticize something without declaring it at some level wrong/false, and thus invalidating his claim to avoid making a judgement call on it.